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THE AUTO -FINANCE CONSENT DECREE
AN EPILOGUE
PHILLIP W. HABERMAN*
HAROLD F. BIRNBAUM**
An article, written over ten years ago analyzed the consent
decrees which had been entered on November 15, 1938, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, in cases brought by the United States against Ford
Motor Company, Chrysler Corporation and certain finance com-
panies, and which contained certain features that constituted
significant precedents of evident importance.
It was pointed out 2 that the purpose of the new policy of the
Department of Justice was to restore and preserve the equilib-
rium of competition, not to dislocate it permanently against
defendants who, in the words of the then Assistant Attorney
General Arnold
. . . confer important public benefits related to restoring
orderly competitive markets which go beyond a promise to
desist from the practices charged, and beyond any results
which could be obtained by a conviction.3
Plainly stated, this is a policy by which the defendants are
first indicted; and then the attorney for the Government exacts
concessions "beyond any results which could be obtained by a
conviction" as the price of filing a nolle prosequi to the indict-
ment. This policy connotes a dangerous assumption of power.
The economic theories and the conception of "public benefits"
entertained by a Government attorney are unorthodox guide-
posts as to which a later incumbent of the same office may differ
radically. Infusing the extra-legal views of an administrative
officer (conservative or radical) into a consent decree holds the
* Member of the Missouri and New York Bars; formerly General Coun-
sel, Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, now C.I.T. Financial Cor-
poration.
** Member of California, Massachusetts and New York Bars.
1. Birnbaum, The Auto Finance Consent Decree: A New Technique in
Enforcing the Sherman Act, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 525 (1939). See also
Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement through Consent Decrees, 53
HARv. L. REV. 386, 395 et seq. (1940); Katz, The Consent Decree in Anti-
trust Administration, 53 HARV. L. REV. 415, 434 et seq. (1940); Note, 63
HARv. L. REV. 320 (1949).
2. Id. at 560.
3. Id. at 528.
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possibility of great danger unless adequate "escape clauses"
have been obtained from the Government in the course of nego-
tiating the decree. The ability of a defendant to avoid being
chained like Prometheus depends on the success of counsel in
working out a safeguard for the client. Without express pro-
visions, the possibility of obtaining relief in the future is con-
ditioned by the rigidity of the rule of United States v. Swift& Co.:4
Nothing less than a clear showing of a grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to
change what was decreed after years of litigation with the
consent of all concerned. 5
The article gave particular emphasis to the provisions of the
two decrees which related to the future position of the defen-
dants in competition with other concerns who were not re-
strained by the decrees. The decrees touch future competition
in various ways.
First, the manufacturers are required to treat all finance
companies alike.6
Second, codes of good conduct were written which related to
such matters as wage assignments, repossession and foreclosure
procedures, delinquency charges, and insurance coverage; and
mechanics were provided whereby the defendant manufacturers
were free to give preferential treatment and competitive advan-
tages to any individual finance companies (whether or not they
were defendants) who voluntarily agreed to conform to these
codes.7 In ten years, not a single finance company has taken
advantage of this provision of either decree,8 which seems to
indicate that American business concerns are fundamentally
opposed to regulation, no matter how slight its burden or how
attractive the inducement to submit to regulation voluntarily.
Third, although the Department refused to make the com-
plainants automatically subject to the same restraints as the
decree imposed on the defendants, 9 there is a provision which
required the anti-trust division to take cognizance of the activi-
ties of those competitors of a defendant who were or became
4. 286 U. S. 106 (1932).
5. Id. at 119.
6. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 536-47.
7. Id. at 547-50.
8. Letter from Clerk of U. S. District Court, December 15, 1948.
9. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 553-4.
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large enough to do at least one-fourth as much business as the
defendant. 0
Fourth, paragraph 18 of the decrees provides that, after four
years from the date of entry, any respondent may apply to
vacate the decree in whole or in part, or to modify it, on the
ground that the commission of any of the acts which the decree
prohibits or the omission of any of the acts which the decree
requires, would not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act 1
under the economic or competitive conditions existing at the
time of the application.12 Most significantly, the decree states
that it shall not be material to such application "... whether or
not such economic or competitive conditions are new or unfore-
seen." In that manner the District Court which entered the
decree also ruled that the doctrine of United States V. Swift &
Co. should not be applicable, when the application to vacate or
modify was made on the ground stated above.3
Fifth, and most important, the decree contained three specific
provisions regarding competition between the defendants and
General Motors Corporation.14 That company was also under
indictment, together with its finance company subsidiary,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation. They were not party
to any consent decree and were later convicted of violating the
Sherman Act. 5
(a) The decree prohibited the defendant manufacturers (Ford
and Chrysler) from owning, controlling, having an interest in
or dealing with a finance company, but this prohibition would be
lifted on application of any respondent unless a final decree was
entered prior to January 1, 1941, requiring General Motors
10. Id. at 559.
11. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1, et seq. (1927).
12. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 555.
13. The "escape clauses" which were interpreted and given effect by
the Supreme Court in accordance with their terms, in Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, infra, note 18, are provisions of a specific character con-
tained in paragraphs 12 and 12(a) and were designed to permit relief
against specific restraints contained in the decree. Those clauses were
invoked as bases of the motions for relief upon which the proceedings
were instituted and which resulted in action of the Supreme Court. No
prayer for general relief was presented in that case based on paragraph18 of the decree, which is an all-inclusive omnibus clause designed to leave
a wide open door for future relief if the need therefor develops because
of economic or competitive conditions arising in the long-range future.
14. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 555-9.
15. 26 F. Supp. 353 (N.-D. Ind. 1939), 121 F. 2d. 376 (7th Cir. 1939);
cert. denied 314 U. S. 618 (1941); rehearing denied 314 U. S. 710 (1942).
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Corporation permanently to divest itself of ownership and con-
trol of its finance subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration1
(b) Prior to divestment, General Motors would be able to
cause its subsidiary to offer lower finance rates than were
available for buyers of Ford or Chrysler cars; if this is done,
the respondent manufacturers are able to subsidize other finance
companies to meet the rate war.'7
(c) Most important, the continuation of the decrees was made
to depend on the outcome of the proceedings against General
Motors.', If General Motors was not convicted, all of the re-
straints of the decree would be lifted until equivalent restraints
were imposed on General Motors and its subsidiary by civil
decree, either consent or litigated. If General Motors was con-
victed, the decree would be continued only to the extent that the
restraints related to agreements, acts or practices whose illegal-
ity had been established by the conviction (or whose performance
by General Motors was restrained by a civil decree). Under a
general verdict of guilty, the charge to the jury is determina-
tive; and those agreements, acts or practices which the court
instructed the jury would support a general verdict of guilty are
deemed to be thus declared illegal. A special verdict of guilty,
or a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere is deemed to
declare the illegality of any agreement, act, or practice which is
its subject matter.
The time limit for imposing similar restraints upon General
Motors (either by judgment of conviction, or by civil decree)
was originally January 1, 1940, but for several years the
government requested and the defendants agreed to extensions.
Now, upon the third attempt,19 the restraints have been sus-
pended under the express terms of the decrees.
The first attempt under paragraph 12 of the decree to take
advantage of the government's failure to obtain a divestment by
General Motors within the time limit was denied by the District
16. Final Decree, United States v. Ford Motor Co. and United States
v. Chrysler Corp. (N. D. Ind. 1938), %12, quoted in footnote at 335 U. S.
303, 307 (1948).
17. Id. at 112a(4), quoted in footnote, id. at 311.
18. Id. at 12a(1)-(3).
19. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U. S. 303 (1948).
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Court, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of
a quorum of Justices qualified to hear the case.20
The second attempt likewise grew out of an order of the
District Court which further extended the time limit for divest-
ment under paragraph 12, against the protest of Chrysler. On
appeal, the government prevailed in a 4-2 decision.21
The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Byrnes, who
was joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and
Douglas. The court holds that the District Court retained
jurisdiction to modify the original decree under its express
terms, and that there was no abuse of discretion in extending
the time limit of paragraph 12, even though one of the parties
to the decree protested.
The process of reasoning was stated in terms which made no
distinction between a consent decree and a litigated decree. The
court said that the test was
whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the
basic purpose of the original consent decree.22
It stated that this basic purpose was to determine the ultimate
rights of the parties by the outcome of the anti-trust proceed-
ings against General Motors. It ruled that the propriety of
continuing the ban on Chrysler's ownership of a finance company
after the time limit specified in the decree depended on whether
Chrysler was thereby placed at a competitive disadvantage.
It placed the burden of proof upon Chrysler and found that
Chrysler had made no such showing.
Thus, the majority opinion gave no effect to the factor of
consent pursuant to which the ban of the decree was imposed.
The Government had never established any violation of law by
Chrysler, nor had Chrysler ever admitted such violation. On
the contrary, the decrees specifically recited the defendants'
assertion of their innocence. 23 Chrysler had expressly consented
to be bound by the ban only until a specified date, if General
Motors was still free on that date to own a finance company; its
consent was not dependent upon competitive disadvantage.
20. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 314 U. S. 583 (1941); rehealing
denied 314 U. S. 716 (1942).
21. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S. 556 (1942).
22. Id. at 562.
23. Decree, op. cit. supra note 16, %1; Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 554.
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This was fully recognized in the minority opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in which Mr. Justice Reed joined.
Obviously, it was an essential feature of the consent decree
against Chrysler that the prohibition of affiliation with the
finance company should result in this great competitive
disadvantage only long enough to enable the Government
to press its claim against General Motors to successful con-
clusion with all reasonable speed. The parties might have
refrained from fixing any definite period, leaving the matter
wholly for determination in the future and by undefined
standards of reasonableness. Instead, the Government chose
to specify with particularity the length of the period-more
than two years-in which Chrysler would be required to
bear competitive hardships resulting from the lack of the
same restraints upon General Motors.2 -
The minority agreed with the majority, that the District
Court had power to modify the consent decree to effectuate its
basic purpose. But, the minority argued, the burden was on the
Government, as the moving party, to show that circumstances
justified a change in the specified date.
In other words, in 1942, it appeared to be the law that even if
a consent decree specified that it would remain in effect only
until a given date, the court retained inherent power to extend
the date. The only issue, as between the majority and minority
opinions, was as to the burden of proof. The majority held that
the defendant had the burden of showing that adherence to the
original date would effectuate the main purpose of the decree.
The minority urged that the burden was on the Government to
show that extension of the original date would effectuate this
purpose. Neither view conceded any validity to the defendant's
claim that it was entitled to stand upon the letter of its consent.
In 1948 the issue was again presented to the court by the de-
fendants named in the Ford consent decree. This time they
asked broader relief: Ford asked relief, under paragraph 12,
from the ban on its owning or controlling a finance company;
and both defendants asked for the suspension and modification,
under paragraph 12a, of various provisions of the decree, on
the ground that the practices therein prohibited had not been
held by the trial court in the General Motors case, in its instruc-
tions to the jury, to constitute a proper basis for the return of
a general verdict of guilty.
24. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S. 556, 565 (1942).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/8
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This time Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the prevailing
opinion, concurred in by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed
and Burton. Mr. Justice Black dissented; Mr. Justice Rutledge
concurred; and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in part. Justices
Murphy and Jackson did not participate.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the decision is that
the majority now appears to give full validity to the limitations
of the defendants' consent. It will be recalled that in 1942 both
majority and minority had held that the District Court had
inherent power to extend the period for which the defendants
had consented to be bound; the only issue was as to the burden
of proof.25 In 1948, in the words of the majority:
If the Government seeks to outlaw possible arrangements
by Ford with a finance corporation, it must establish its
case in court against Ford as against General Motors and
not draw on a consent which by its very terms is not
available.2S [italics supplied]
The minority opinion starts out:
The Court appears to accept the argument of appellant
that this consent decree must be treated as though it were a
contract between private persons for purchase of an auto-
mobile. But a consent decree is not a contract. A consent
decree in an antitrust proceeding like a decree entered after
a contest must be treated as a judicial determination and
order made in the public interest. United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-115.27
This approach of the minority seems to overlook the substance
of the relationship, and to exalt its formula.
Of course a consent decree is not a mere contract between
the Department of Justice and the defendants; no one would
suggest that the parties could agree subsequently upon a modi-
fication and that the court would be bound to rubber-stamp the
change. No more would it be contended that there was a contract
between the court and the parties.
On the other hand, the court in making a decree is an agent
of the sovereign at work. A statement in the decree that its
provisions will be suspended under given conditions at a specified
future date is at least a unilateral pledge of the sovereign's word.
Perhaps one cannot go so far as to say that never, under any
25. Supra, page 51.
26. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U. S. 303, 322 (1948).
27. Ibid.
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circumstances, may the sovereign directly or indirectly break
the letter or the spirit of its word. The memory of the gold
clause cases2K is a warning that the nation's survival may be
considered to require narrow distinctions to be drawn or implied
reservations to be read into the Government's contracts.
However, different considerations apply to the suspension of
a consent decree. The Government becomes free to litigate as
to the legality of the defendant's conduct and to obtain relief
according to purely judicial standards. 29 The conditions of sus-
pension should be met fairly and ungrudgingly.
Moreover, as between the majority30 and the minority,31 it
seems clear that the suspension of a decree is no immunity bath.
On the contrary, prudence would seem to warn such defendants
to give a wide berth to borderline activities.
* * 4 * * *
One further point deserves comment: when the principle was
established, in the negotiations for the consent decrees, that the
defendants were ultimately to be put in the same competitive
status as General Motors, it was not known whether the General
Motors proceedings would ultimately terminate in a civil decree,
a criminal judgment, or both. On the assumption that if General
Motors were convicted the Government might take no further
legal steps against it. it became the problem of the draftsmen
of the consent decrees to frame a standard by which to compare
civil proceedings against Chrysler and Ford with criminal
proceedings against General Motors; the lawyers could only
hope that they would be able to propose a sufficiently definite
test.
32
28. See Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935).
29. See the position of the department, Decree, op. cit. supra note 16,
1.
30. "The lifting of the restraints imposed by the consent decree does
not, of course, affect the liability of Ford for any violations of the Sherman
Law that the Government may establish in court." Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 335 U. S. 303, 320 (1948).
31. "For if Ford should after today 'affiliate' with C. I. T., or renew
its 'persuasion' of dealers, could it be expected that this court would there-
after hold these other companies legally responsible, even though it should
be thought that today's permitted conduct ran afoul of the antitrust law?
Is it conceivable that if Ford now 'affiliates' with C. I. T., Ford's 'vested
interest', acquired with this court's tacit approval, would be taken from
Ford by a federal court?" Id. at 328.
32. Cf. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 558-9.
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It is a great tribute to the English language that it was pos-
sible to frame a comparison which a majority of the court
characterized as "a litmus-paper test for determining what
restraints survive ;,,33 and as to which the opinion could say that:
it [sub-paragraph 12(a) (2) of the decree] provided a
definite standard for ascertaining what rules of law were
at a future date to be made binding on a competitor of Ford.
The rules which the trial judge [in his instructions to the
jury] formulated against General Motors were thereafter
to be the rules of law against Ford.8 '
The outcome of the Ford case may make the Department
"gun-shy" of decrees which are drawn with an eye to the de-
fendant's future competitive position. This would be under-
standable but most unfortunate.
The Ford consent decree (like the companion decree against
Chrysler) was the result of protracted negotiations. It evi-
denced a forward conception in the administration of the anti-
trust laws. Prior thereto, there were examples in which a re-
straint incorporated in a consent decree operated to freeze a
defendant to its permanent disadvantage although competitors
were not subject to the same restraints, merely because such a
result was not "unforeseen", in the words of the Swift case.
The Ford decree made provision to maintain equilibrium of
competition. Although it restrained the defendants, its essence
was tantamount to a warning to those who were not parties to
the decree that the administration of the anti-trust laws would
be sufficiently flexible so that the defendants would not be sub-
jected permanently to unchangeable restraints which were not
imposed on competitors.
A consent decree is much like legislation, but on a private
level. It is almost a private or special statute, drawn not by
Congress but by the parties and the court. A policy under which
the defendant is placed at a permanent competitive disadvantage
is unworkable. Fairness and feasibility alike require that the
decree say to the defendant: for a fixed period of time you will
be restrained from certain practices; after that time the rules
will be the same for all competitors.
33. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U. S. 303, 312 (1948).
34. Id. at 319.
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